A Consideration of the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident as Apologia

The Rogers report seems to be more than just a report to explain the Challenger accident and give suggestions to avoid a similar tragedy occurring in the future. In a sense, it appears to be a type of apologia. On January 28, 1986 the Space Shuttle Challenger, mission 51-L, launched from Florida's Kennedy Air force Base at 11:38 a.m. Eastern Stand ard Time. As the country watched in disbelief, the shuttle disintegrated 73 seconds later in an explosion of hydrogen and oxygen. All seven crew members died. On February 3, President Reagan issued an executive order to set up a commission to investigate the challenger accident. The commission was sworn in on February 6, and presented its report to the president on June 6 of the same year. This report, commonly known as the Rogers Report, after its chairman William R. Roger, had a dual mandate from the president. First to look at the probable causes of the accident, and second, to develop recommendations for corrective action. This was done through a comprehensive investigation involving all of the following: interviews with more than 160 people, more than 35 formal panel investigations, examination of more than 6,300 documents (which included hundreds of photographs and more then 122,000 pages), the generation of almost 12,000 pages of transcript and another 2,800 pages of hearing transcripts.

Holombo, Chrystal. Michigan Tech University (1998). Articles>Technology>Risk Communication>Engineering

Mistakes Can Be Costly

In the aircraft industry, a number of factors have converged to highlight the importance of maintenance manuals.

Between the Lines (2007). Articles>Documentation>Engineering>Risk Communication

Safety Risks in Mechanical Engineering

The cause for the careless handling of possible dangers is not so much unwillingness, but rather the lack of know-how. There are no standardised and well-documented processes that are simple to implement and use.

Walther, Andreas. TC-FORUM (2002). Articles>Risk Communication>Engineering

Understanding Failures in Organizational Discourse: The Accident at Three Mile Island and the Shuttle Challenger Disaster  

Both the Challenger and Three Mile Island disasters involved failures of communication among ordinary professional people, mistakes committed in the course of routine work on the job, small mishaps with grotesque conseqences.

Herndl, Carl G., Barbara A. Fennell and Carolyn R. Miller. WAC Clearinghouse (1991). Articles>Risk Communication>Engineering